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CITY VERSUS COUNTRYSIDE 
IN CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT 
The economic and cultural gap between city and countryside is one 
of the most fundamental problems of development. Research 
indicates that when development occurs, almost always there is a 
profound urban bias, with rural cultivators losing out economically 
and being looked down upon by their urban countrymen. I 
Development via centralised socialist planning does not avoid this 
urban bias and may make things even worse. Certainly, if the 
example of the former Soviet Union is any guide, socialist 
development may involve not simply disadvantages but brutal 
mistreatment of the rural population.2 Soviet state socialism was 
marked by a profound urban bias throughout its history. 
2 
The most comprehensive treatment of urban bias in development is 
Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977). For exceptions to this pattern, see John H. 
C. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, Growth with Equity: The 
Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Robert H. 
Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of 
Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989). The disadvantages suffered by rural residents are not 
solely economic, but extend to all areas of social life. For example, 
Barrington Moore argued in his classic work, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), that 
regardless of whether the political outcome of early modem change 
processes was dictatorship or democracy, the peasants always lost 
out politically. 
The literature dealing with the semi-feudal subjugation and brutal 
mistreatment of the Soviet rural population in the Stalin era is 
massive. The most compelling indictment is Robert Conquest, 
Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine 
2 
Observers of post-1949 China for a time believed that Chinese 
state socialism was different and was avoiding the urban biases that 
characterise development almost everywhere else. Unlike the 
situation in Russia, Mao Zedong and many of the other significant 
leaders of the Chinese communist revolution (including Deng 
Xiaoping) were born and grew up in the countryside. Even though 
these Party leaders of peasant origin gravitated to the cities and 
even abroad in early adulthood, the rupture of the first united front 
in 1927 led them to seek a new power base in China's countryside. 
As is well known, when they marched to victory in 1949, it was at 
the head of an overwhelmingly peasant-based army and a similarly 
predominantly rural-origin Chinese Communist Party. The 
consolidation of power saw hundreds of thousands of rural veterans 
of the revolutionary struggles put in charge of all manner of urban 
institutions, with new urban recruits to the cause placed, for the 
most part, in subordinate posts.3 If, as Michael Lipton and others 
3 
(New York: Oxford Uriiversity Press, 1986). A recent study 
estimates that nine million excess deaths can be attributed to 
collectivisation in the USSR. See Massimo Livi-Bacci, 'On the 
Human Costs of Collectivisation in the Soviet Union', Population 
and Development Review 19 (1993), pp.743-66. The long-term 
problems of Soviet agriculture can be traced to the neglect and 
mistreatment of the rural population. Of course, as James Millar 
points out, as a consequence of these difficulties, the authorities had 
to invest very substantial sums in rural areas in order to avoid even 
worse agricultural problems, so the pattern of state investment was 
not tipped in favour of urban areas as the phrase 'primitive socialist 
accumulation' might indicate. See his article, 'Mass Collectivisation 
and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year 
Plan', Slavic Review 33 (1974), pp.750-66. 
The tensions caused when poorly educated rural veterans of the 
revolution gave orders to much more highly educated urban 
subordinates became one of the sore points raised during the 1957 
Hundred Flowers Campaign. In the ensuing Anti-Rightist Campaign, 
of course, the rural veterans obtained revenge for these insults and 
consolidated their power even more fully by purging their critics. 
3 
argue, the city origins and preferences of elites in most developing 
countries are a major source of urban bias in development, these 
special conditions should have helped exempt China from the 
general pattem.4 
A combination of slogans and policies adopted in subsequent 
years appeared to be vigorously combatting any tendency for the 
fruits of victory in the Chinese revolution to be monopolised by 
urbanites. More was involved than simply the rhetoric of 
'agriculture first', 'industry should serve agriculture', and 
'overcome the three great differences' (one of which was the gap 
between town and countryside).5 Numerous efforts - to freeze 
urban wages, limit the growth of cities, send educated urbanites 
down to the countryside, and emphasise rural industry and 
cooperative medical insurance, for example - seemed to indicate 
that development of a different sort was taking place. A number of 
observers concluded that the rural origins of the revolution 
translated into a Chinese development path that was at least 
balanced or even biased in favour of the countryside.6 
4 
5 
6 
See the discussion in Lipton, op. cit.; Bates, op. cit. Other 
explanations of urban bias focus on capitalist institutions or the role 
of world market forces, and these factors were also largely absent in 
post-1949 China. 
The other two 'great differences' are those between workers and 
peasants and between mental and manual labourers. 
For examples of this evaluation of development in the pre-1978 
period, see Charles Cell, 'Deurbanization in China: The Rural-Urban 
Contradiction', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 11 (1979), 
pp.62-72; John Gurley, 'Capitalist and Maoist Economic 
Development', in E. Friedman and M. Selden (eds), America's Asia 
(New York: Vintage, 1971). This sort of favourable evaluation was 
not limited to Cultural Revolution enthusiasts. A more restrained 
version of the same evaluation can be found in Alexander Eckstein, 
China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977). On page 304 of that work Eckstein concludes that ' ... 
average urban-rural income differentials were almost certainly 
narrowed in the past twenty years'. See also Dwight Perkins, 'The 
4 
It is now quite evident that these claims were wrong. In fact 
the policies and practices adopted during the period from the 1950s 
to the 1970s profoundly favoured urbanites and systematically 
disadvantaged China's rural population. Indeed, in certain respects 
an urban bias developed in more extreme forms than are visible in 
other developing societies or even in the Soviet Union. This is 
perhaps the supreme irony of the Chinese revolution - that rural 
revolutionaries who were committed to combatting urban bias 
ended up institutionalising precisely that bias in extreme and deep-
rooted forms. China today still suffers from the effects of this 
development. In this paper I describe the situation both before and 
after 1949 and then speculate on some of the reasons for this ironic 
outcome of China's rural revolution. Finally, and more tenatively, I 
discuss whether the post-1978 reforms have been at all successful 
in reversing this urban bias. 
The Pre-1949 Gap between Town and Countryside 
As I read the evidence, the gap between town and countryside was 
relatively modest in China in imperial times but appeared to be 
increasing in the century prior to 1949 .7 There are no good 
aggregate income figures available to support the 'minimal gap' 
conclusion, which is based on general accounts of cultural patterns, 
life styles, and geographic and social mobility. China for centuries 
had lacked the kind of serf-like subordination of the peasantry that 
had characterised many European countries and Japan. China's 
open class system imposed no legal barriers to prevent rural 
7 
Central Features of China's Economic Development', in R. 
Demberger (ed.), China's Development Experience in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
The pre-1949 situation is discussed more fully in my article, 'Town 
and Country in Contemporary China', Comparative Urban Research 
(Summer 1983). See also Frederick Mote, 'The City in Traditional 
Chinese Civilization', in James T. C. Liu and Wei-ming Tu (eds), 
Traditional China (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
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residents from moving to the cities and taking up urban 
occupations, and the rural roots of many urbanites colored rural-
urban relations. Rhoads Murphey provides the following 
generalisations: 'In China there was no such split between urban 
and rural worlds [as in the West], and no place in ... traditional 
China for Marx's contempt for the "idiocy of rural life" ... There 
was no denigration of rural circumstances and values, but rather, on 
the part of many urbanites, a longing for the countryside, to which 
they would retreat whenever they could and to which they almost 
invariably retired'.8 
China's cities in the late l 9th century were still organised in 
substantial measure in terms of rural native place and clan 
associations, and its villages in terms of lineages, and in 
combination these institutions fostered close human connections 
between rural and urban Chinese. China's villages poured out 
regular streams of sojourners to work in cities and send back 
remittances to their families , and those who put down city roots and 
raised families there nonetheless often kept close ties with their 
rural places of origin - returning for visits on holidays, for 
celebrations of family events, and perhaps even to be buried.9 
Certainly these characteristics of the late imperial Chinese social 
order have to be balanced against a recognition that cities were 
places in which power and wealth were concentrated and where life 
8 
9 
Rhoads Murphey, The Fading of the Maoist Vision (New York: 
Methuen, 1980), p.21. 
On the openness of Chinese villages to geographic and social 
mobility, see in particular G. William Skinner, 'Chinese Peasants 
and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case', Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 13 (1971), pp.270-81; and 'Mobility 
Strategies in Late Imperial China: A Regional Systems Analysis', 
Regional Analysis 1 (1976), pp.327-64. The limited nature of urban 
consciousness in China is conveyed by the way in which urban 
Chinese, if asked where they were from, would generally give their 
rural places of origin, even if they were born and brought up in the 
city and had never even been to their native place. 
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was much more varied and cosmopolitan than in villages. My claim 
is not that China at the time lacked a rural-urban gap, but that this 
gap was relatively small in comparative perspective. 
The generalisation that the gap between town and countyside 
in China was increasing during the century prior to 1949 is 
similarly based upon impressionistic evidence, rather than on 
systematic statistics. After the 1840s many of China's cities were, 
of course, part of the system of treaty ports in which extra-territorial 
privileges were granted to foreign powers. Although Western 
contact and influence were not confined to China's cities, the 
emergence of new life styles and cultural patterns modeled after 
those of the West was primarily concentrated in urban locales. 
Some have argued that the increasing disorders of the century prior 
to 1949 also prompted large numbers of rural elites to flee to the 
greater comfort and security of the cities. The resulting rise of 
absentee landlordism helped to undermine the social bonds between 
city and countryside. As a result of these trends, not only the 
Chinese Communists but also their liberal critics characterised 
China's cities in the twentieth century as having an increasingly 
parasitic relationship toward the countryside. to While these trends 
may have threatened the social bonds that linked China's rural and 
urban areas into one society, their impact pales in comparison with 
the forces that aggravated the gap between town and countryside 
after 1949. 
Urban Bias in China, 1949-78 
Five primary manifestations of urban bias were evident during this 
period: a widening gap in income, declining migration and 
weakened kinship bonds, implementation of divergent 
organisational systems, enforced contact and stigmatisation of the 
10 See, for example, Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China's Gentry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), chs 5, 7. 
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peasantry, and a growing disparity in culture and customs.I I These 
will be examined in tum. I make no claim here that Mao and other 
Chinese leaders intended to increase the rural-urban divide. The 
irony that abounds in this realm lies in the fact that the gap between 
town and countryside was widened by measures that were often 
intended to have the opposite effect. 
Increasing Gap in Incomes 
The surveys and official statistics for periods prior to the 1980s are 
highly imperfect, but the available evidence indicates that the gap 
between the average incomes of China's urban and rural 
populations increased between the 1950s and 1970s and became 
unusually large in comparative terms. The urban-rural per capita 
income ratio seems to have been of the order of 2:1 in the 1950s 
and widened to 2.5:1 or even 3:1 by the time that Mao died, 
although some authorities give estimates for the 1970s as high as 5 
or 6: 1 (see Table 1, line 1).12 During this same period the ratio of 
II 
12 
My analysis differs from one presented earlier by Marc Blecher. See 
his article, 'Balance and Cleavage in Urban-Rural Relations', in 
William Parish (ed.), Chinese Rural Development: The Great 
Transformation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). Blecher argued that 
in terms of the distribution of income and other resources the rural-
urban gap declined after 1949, while the status cleavage between 
villagers and urbanites increased. Evidence now indicates that both 
'imbalance' and 'cleavage' characterised the 1949-78 period. 
For one well-informed estimate for the 1950s, see Christopher Howe, 
Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China: 1949-1972 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.50. Dwight 
Perkins and Shahid Yusuf estimate that the per capita urban-rural 
income ratio widened from 3.9: 1 in 1957 to 5.5: 1 in 1975. See 
Perkins and Yusuf, Rural Development in China (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.127. Thomas Rawski estimates 
that the urban-rural income gap had widened by 1978 to between 5:1 
and 6: 1. See Rawski, 'The Simple Arithmetic of Chinese Income 
Distribution', Keizai kenkyu [Economic Research] 33 (1982), pp.12-
8 
consumption of food grains, vegetable oils, and cotton cloth 
between urbanites and rural residents also widened sharply, in part 
due to the use of imports to protect urban consumption levels.13 As 
a result of this divergence, the disparity between the incomes and 
living standards of China's urban and rural residents in recent times 
has been unusually large - larger than the gap in India, 
Bangladesh, and Southeast Asian countries, and much wider than 
the comparable gap in Taiwan.14 
13 
14 
26. One discordant set of official figures provided by China's State 
Statistical Bureau is cited by Zhao Renwei. According to these 
figures, the ratio was 3.48: 1 in 1957 but only 2.38: 1 in 1964 and 
2.36:1 in 1978 (see Table 1, line 2). See his article, 'Three Features 
of the Distribution of Income during the Transition to Reform', in 
Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds), The Distribution of Income in 
China (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.82. The 1957 figure appears 
implausible in view of other estimates; the later figures still indicate 
an unusually large gap in international comparative perspective. 
See Nicholas Lardy, 'Food Consumption in the People's Republic of 
China', in R. Barker, R. Sinha and B. Rose (eds), The Chinese 
Agricultural Economy (Boulder: Westview, 1982), pp.157-8; 
Nicholas Lardy, Agriculture in China's Modem Economic 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch.4. 
For detailed comparative statistics on urban and rural consumption of 
various commodities over the period from 1952 to 1984, consult 
Jeffrey Taylor and Karen Hardee, Consumer Demand in China 
(Boulder: Westview, 1986). 
An unusually comprehensive and systematic survey of rural and 
urban incomes conducted through a Chinese-Western collabouration 
in 1988 yielded an estimate of the ratio of per capita incomes in 
China's urban and rural areas of 2.42: 1. This compares with 
estimates in recent years for India of 1.4:1, Bangladesh 1.5, 
Indonesia 1.7, the Phillipines 2.1, and Thailand 2.2. See Griffin and 
Zhao, op. cit., pp.69, 83. Surveys in Taiwan found that the urban to 
rural per capita income ratio was only 1.2 in 1966, although it 
widened somewhat to 1.5 in 1972 (the non-farm to farm income 
ratios were narrower - 1.02 and 1.32 in the same years). See Fei, 
Ranis and Kuo, op. cit., pp.244-5. See also the figures presented in 
9 
The reasons for this growing disparity are numerous. On the 
urban side of the picture, despite a long-term wage freeze enforced 
after the 1950s, increases in the proportion of urban family 
members who were employed, and particularly of married women, 
helped to increase family cash incomes. More to the point, the 
growing dominance of state sector employment in urban areas and 
the wide range of fringe benefits and subsidies which state sector 
employees enjoyed boosted real urban incomes even when wages 
were relatively stagnant. On the rural side of the equation, the 
devastation produced by the Great Leap Forward, along with low 
state grain procurement prices, anemic state investment in 
agriculture, recurrent bureaucratic interference in cropping patterns, 
restrictions on off-farm economic activities, and demands that local 
funds be used to support an increasing range of facilities and 
services helped to perpetuate the immiseration of rural families in 
many parts of China.15 The legacy of the Great Leap Forward 
weighs particularly heavily in this picture. In addition to depressed 
rural incomes, the estimated 30 million excess deaths produced by 
this campaign - overwhelmingly deaths of rural residents -
provide powerful testimony against claims that Mao's policies 
favoured the countryside.16 
15 
16 
Lipton, op. cit. Economist Lloyd Reynolds earlier estimated that, in 
terms of the distribution of skills required, an income gap between 
25-30 per cent between cities and countryside was perhaps justifiable 
(cited in Howe, op. cit., p.8). 
See the discussion in Nicholas Lardy, 'State Intervention and Peasant 
Opportunities', in W. Parish (ed.), Chinese Rural Development: The 
Great Transformation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985); Lardy, 
Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development, op. cit. 
See the discussion in Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and 
Robin Zeitz, 'Famine in China, 1958-61 ', Population and 
Development Review 10 (1984), pp.613-45; Peng Xizhe, 
'Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's 
Provinces', Population and Development Review 13 (1987), pp.639-
70. 
10 
Yet arguably the most important source of the growing income 
gap between rural and urban residents after the 1950s was instead 
the elaborate system of migration restrictions implemented in China 
during the period of Mao Zedong's rule. The combination of 
household registration requirements and rationing that was 
implemented after the 1950s effectively interrupted almost all of 
the free movement of people across the rural-urban divide that had 
existed prior to the revolution. 17 China's rural residents were 
penalised in multiple ways. Depressed villages could not react to 
hard times by having members go off to the city in search of 
employment opportunities, and thus few rural families could count 
on urban remittances to ease their poverty. The combination of 
migration restrictions and the collectivised form of agriculture 
implemented after 1956 also interfered with migration from 
depressed rural areas to more prosperous villages. China's 
communes and their subdivisions became, in effect, exclusive 
membership organisations, and except for new brides it became 
very difficult for outsiders to gain admission.IS A final way in 
17 
18 
There were, as is well known, limited exceptions to this interruption 
of rural-urban migration. Students admitted to urban schools, 
villagers whose land was confiscated for industrial development, and 
a number of other categories of individuals were entitled to move 
into urban places and change their registrations from rural to urban. 
In addition, urban work units in a number of circumstances 
employed temporary or contract workers from the countryside, 
although the latter were usually not entitled to change to an urban 
registration. These limited and selective movements of rural 
individuals into the cities only in a minor way qualify the general 
point about the interruption of rural-urban migration. 
Brides were able to join the production teams of their new husbands, 
and as a consequence there was a strong tendency for women to 
leave poor villages and marry into richer ones, and to move from 
hills to plains and from distant villages toward the suburbs of cities. 
See William Lavely, 'Marriage and Mobility under Rural 
Collectivism', in R. Watson and P. Ebrey (eds), Marriage and 
Inequality in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California 
11 
which changes in migration control after the 1950s harmed rural 
areas lay in the burdens imposed by the official demand that 
millions of urban residents be resettled in the countryside. Although 
rural areas received initial 'settling down' subsidies to help them 
cope with those rusticated from the cities, and some of the latter 
eventually earned their keep, on balance many rural communities 
felt that the effect of this reverse migration was more a drain than a 
contribution.19 
China's strict institutions designed to 'keep 'em down on the 
farm' were seen by some observers as a way to aid rural 
development by preventing a 'brain drain' of talent out of the 
countryside. However, in so doing China assured that for the most 
part advantaged areas (including urban areas in general) would 
remain so, while depressed rural regions would be deprived of one 
of the most effective means of escaping from poverty. Dwight 
Perkins and Shahid Yusuf have argued that in any society the 
freedom of movement of individuals and families is a very effective 
natural mechanism for spreading development from richer 
communities to disadvantaged locales and groups.20 Brains are not 
being 'drained' if talented individuals can bring more benefits to 
19 
20 
Press, 1991). Men, however, had a much more difficult time moving 
to another village. Lavely argues that in localities where prior to 
1949 uxorilocal marriages - the groom moving to live with his 
bride's family - were fairly common, collectivisation made such 
marriages less acceptable. 
For a general discussion of the program of sending people to the 
countryside, see Thomas Bernstein, Up to the Mountains, Down to 
the Villages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
See Perkins and Yusuf, op. cit., ch.6. China' s emphasis during the 
period of collectivised agriculture on self-reliance and on 'learning 
from Dazhai' can in this sense be seen as an exhortation to poor 
communities to pull themselves up by their bootstraps in the absence 
of substantial state assistance or the freedom of villagers to take 
advantage of outside economic opportunities. 
------,------------
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their families and home communities by migrating than by staying 
at home.21 
Despite this widening income gap, it is not the case that every 
aspect of rural and urban welfare diverged during the 1949-78 
period. Education and health care are realms in which the rural-
urban gap declined somewhat during these years, although the 
picture is not entirely unambiguous. For example, in 1962 only 37 .1 
per cent of the students enrolled in lower middle schools were rural, 
as were only 7.8 per cent of the students enrolled in upper middle 
schools. By 1971 the rural share of lower middle school 
enrollments had been boosted to 73 per cent, and by 1978 to 77 .5 
per cent; for upper middle schooling the rural share rose to about 61 
per cent in both 1971 and 1978 (see Table 1, lines 5-6).22 To be 
21 
22 
One of the main sources of the relative rural-urban parity in 
Taiwan's development is the combination of migration and 
remittances. See the discussion in Susan Greenhalgh, 'Families and 
Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development', in Edwin A. 
Winkler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds), Contending Approaches to the 
Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1988). 
Migrants may return with new skills and contacts, and they may set 
off chain migration, so that the benefits received in the home 
community need not be limited to the money received as remittances. 
Given the distinctive strength of family obligations in the Chinese 
kinship system, the likelihood of migrants benefiting their home 
communities and families is greater than in most other societies. For 
a clear illustration, involving an isolated village in Hong Kong being 
lifted out of poverty as a result of the restaurants its migrants 
established in Britain, see James L. Watson, Emigration and the 
Chinese Lineage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
Figures from Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1949-1981 [China 
Education Almanac, 1949-1981) (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 
1984), p.1006. The figure given for the rural share of upper middle 
schooling in 1977 is even higher - 66 per cent. For primary 
schooling the increases were Jess dramatic - from a 77.2 per cent 
rural share of primary enrollments in 1962 to a 83.6 per cent figure 
for 1971 and 88.1 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, line 4). See ibid., 
13 
sure, some of this increase is artificial, attributable to the truncation 
of years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution and the 
relabeling of village primary schools as primary-and-lower middle 
schools. Nonetheless, the increases in rural enrollments were 
impressive, particularly those at the upper middle school level, 
which usually required getting to a school in the commune town. 
A similar indicator on the health care front is the proportion of 
hospital beds in rural areas. In 1949 only 25.2 per cent of hospital 
beds were in rural hospitals (at the county level and below). This 
figure rose to 40.2 per cent by 1965, 53.8 per cent in 1970, 60.1 per 
cent in 1975, and 61.4 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, line 7).23 This 
23 
p.1023. By the latter years some of the rural gain can be attributed to 
the faster urban decrease in fertility. Another indicator of the 
education gap is found in an article examining the educational 
attainment of women, using data from the 1982 census. For women 
born in the year 1940, there was a 50 per cent higher illiteracy rate 
(67 per cent vs 17 per cent) for rural than for urban women. For 
women born in 1960 the gap had been reduced to 27 per cent (28 per 
cent vs 1 per cent), and for those born in 1965 to 16 per cent (16 per 
cent vs 0 per cent). The same survey shows a more modest closing of 
the gap in rural versus urban completion of secondary schooling by 
women, from a 63 per cent advantage for urban women born in 1955 
(20 per cent vs 83 per cent) to a 48 per cent gap for those women 
born a decade later (48 per cent vs 96 per cent). See William Lavely, 
Xiao Zhenyu, Li Bohua and Ronald Freedman, 'The Rise of Female 
Education in China: National and Regional Patterns', The China 
Quarterly 121 (1990), pp.61-93. 
Percentages calculated from State Statistical Bureau, China 
Statistical Yearbook, 1993 (Beijing: China Statistical Information 
and Consultancy Service, 1993), p.726; Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 
1986 [China Health Yearbook 1986] (Beijing: China Medical 
Publishing House, 1986), p.493 (for 1949 and 1978 figures). I thank 
Gail Henderson for providing me with the latter source and for 
advice on interpreting these statistics. See her article, 'Increased 
Inequality in Health Care', in Deborah Davis and Ezra Vogel (eds), 
Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p.270. It might be noted that the proportion 
14 
final figure is still considerably short of rural-urban parity, but these 
statistics do show realms where the rural-urban gap narrowed 
during the pre-reform period, despite the widening of the gap in so 
many other respects. 
Declining Migration and Weakened Kinship Bonds 
The new barriers to rural-urban migration helped to disrupt the 
chains of human ties that had knit together China's cities and 
villages. During the 1950s, to be sure, there was massive migration 
into the cities, as economic recovery, buoyant economic growth, 
and a mushrooming bureaucratic system created millions of new 
urban employment opportunities that could only be filled by 
recruits from China's countryside. After the Great Leap Forward, 
however, it was as if the last major wave of migrants to the city 
pulled up the ladder behind them and closed the door.24 Sojourning 
in the form of temporary or contract labour jobs in the city was still 
available to the favoured few, but moving to the city was no longer 
a viable option for most of China's villagers. Urbanites found 
themselves enmeshed in very demanding work schedules and 
24 
of doctors serving in rural areas (county and below, but not including 
village health workers and 'barefoot doctors') displayed a different 
trend over time, declining from 81.8 per cent in 1949 to 64.7 per cent 
in 1965, rising slightly to 65.7 per cent in 1970, and then declining 
again to 58.2 per cent in 1975 and 57.2 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, 
line 8). (Figures calculated from the same two sources as for hospital 
beds.) However, since these figures presumably include traditional 
Chinese medical practitioners of varying training, the favourable 
supply situation of rural doctors in the early years may be 
exaggerated. These figures do not allow us to examine separately 
trends in rural and urban supply of modern trained or Western-style 
doctors. 
Actually the change was even more dramatic, since an estimated 20 
million urban residents, most of them recent migrants, were sent 
back to rural areas as part of the response to the collapse of the Great 
Leap Forward. 
15 
organisational discipline. Visits back to rural native places to take 
part in ritual life there became inconvenient or were even 
discouraged. Increasingly, urban young people found that their 
classmates were others similar to themselves, born and brought up 
in the city, rather than a mixture of the city-bred and new rural 
migrants.25 Rural and urban branches of Chinese kin groups 
increasingly became disconnected strands, with different sets of life 
concerns and infrequent contacts.26 Marriage patterns reinforced the 
self-enclosed nature of China's cities. A survey of 2, 170 ever-
married women between the ages of 20 and 55 carried out in 
Beijing in 1991 revealed that 90 per cent of the men these women 
married were Beijing residents at the time of the wedding, and 98 
per cent of the husbands were urbanites!27 
The disruption of the human ties that had linked China's cities 
and villages prior to 1949 was not, to be sure, absolute. Some urban 
25 
26 
27 
For systematic data on the dramatic shift toward urban origins of the 
younger generation in one major Chinese city (Chengdu) see my 
article, 'Adaptation of Rural Family Patterns to Urban Life in 
Chengdu' , in G. Guldin and A. Southall (eds), Urban Anthropology 
in China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993). 
I do not know of systematic statistics to document this 
impressionistic generalisation. I am currently engaged in a 
collabourative research project in Baoding, Hebei, and our 
questionnaire includes a range of questions asking about frequency 
of contacts with and assistance from various relatives. I hope to be 
able to use data from this survey to compare contacts with rural and 
urban kin more systematically. 
Figures computed from the Survey of Marriage and Family in 
Beijing, conducted by the Population Studies Center at the 
University of Michigan, in collabouration with the Beijing College 
of Economics and the Social and Economic Research Centre of the 
Beijing Municipal Government. The degree of urban exclusiveness 
of marriages in Beijing appears to be more extreme than in other 
cities. Data from related surveys I have collabourated on in Chengdu, 
Sichuan, and in Baoding, Hebei, show somewhat higher numbers of 
marriages across the rural-urban divide. 
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parents coped with the dual burdens of work and family 
responsibilities by sending their children to be cared for by rural 
grandparents. Some ailing urban elderly, aware of the growing 
official demands for cremation in the cities, returned to their native 
villages so that they could be sure of a decent burial. Chinese 
kinship bonds and obligations are very strong, and seeking 
assistance from relatives on the other side of the rural-urban divide 
always remained an option. However, a wide variety of changes in 
addition to the new controls on migration created obstacles that 
weakened the social integration of China's cities and rural areas. 
Post-1949 campaigns destroyed the native place and clan 
associations, guilds, and other traditional forms of grass-roots 
associations in China's cities, and the socialist transformation of the 
mid- l 950s secured bureaucratic control over jobs, housing, and 
other urban resources. Through such changes, networks of 
patronage and mutual assistance based upon kinship and native 
place were disrupted, and new networks based upon political 
performance and loyalty were substituted.28 By the same token the 
confiscation of lineage property and the campaigns against 
traditional religious activities and elabourate weddings and funerals 
in rural areas meant that important ritual and family events whose 
celebration had drawn urbanites back to their home villages began 
to disappear.29 Other changes to be discussed below also 
28 
29 
One can debate the degree to which reliance on formal bureaucratic 
procedures replaced reliance on guanxi as a result of the post-1949 
changes, or whether the 'rules of the game' required in order to 
cultivate guanxi simply changed. I think that both kinds of changes 
occurred, but in any case the result was that traditional modes of 
seeking assistance from relatives and personal contacts were no 
longer so effective. The most detailed treatment of the new 
interpersonal order in post-1949 urban China is Andrew Walder, 
Communist Neotraditionalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986). 
The timing of these changes varied. Lineage land and temples were 
for the most part confiscated during the land reform campaign of 
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cumulatively helped to weaken the bonds between relatives on 
opposite sides of the rural-urban divide. 
Implementation of Divergent Organisational Systems 
The psychological and human barriers between rural and urban 
were also increased as a result of the very different organisational 
systems that were implanted in the two realms after the revolution. 
Most urbanites became dependent upon state-run work units 
(danwei) and secondarily on residents' committees (jumin 
weiyuanhui).30 City dwellers worked for fixed wages and received a 
wide range of fringe benefits, lived in cramped but heavily 
subsidised public housing, juggled ration booklets and coupons to 
meet family consumption needs from state stores, coped with 
difficult travel to work on public transportation, and tried to prepare 
their children to succeed in a highly bureaucratic and politically 
volatile environment, one in which their children would not be able 
to contribute economically until adulthood. 
Their rural counterparts also had their lives transformed in a 
bureaucratic direction, but with substantially different results. Life 
in the countryside in the collective era meant not danwei and 
residents' committees, but teams, brigades and communes.JI Work 
points rather than wages determined one's livelihood, and few 
fringe benefits were provided. Housing almost everywhere was 
financed and built by families, without public support or subsidies. 
Similarly, managing family consumption was not so much a matter 
30 
31 
1950-53; the attacks on traditional ritual life and elabourate family 
events peaked during the Great Leap Forward and again during the 
Cultural Revolution. 
For a general overview, see Martin King Whyte and William L. 
Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984 ). 
For an overview, consult William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, 
Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978). 
18 
of ration coupons and state stores, but of combining the fruits of the 
family's own efforts on their private plot with the grain and cash 
they had earned through their collective labours (supplemented, 
when allowed, by free market exchanges). Despite the political 
uncertainties that rural areas shared with urban ones, training by 
parents in agricultural and domestic skills and assistance from 
children in work in both realms remained central to rural families. 
Some of the contrasts I am drawing, to be sure, would be 
found between urban and rural areas in any developing society. My 
claim is that by implementing quite different organisational systems 
in China's cities and rural areas after 1949, Mao and other Chinese 
leaders created conditions that would make the gulf between the life 
experiences and daily concerns of urbanites and villagers much 
wider than in other countries, and certainly much wider than they 
had been in China prior to 1949. In theory some of the contrasts 
listed above involve not urban versus rural but state versus 
collective employment. For example, state employees residing in 
the countryside faced a somewhat hybrid existence, with fixed 
wages and ration coupons, but usually not subsidised public 
housing. However, life for those dependent upon urban collective 
employment was much more similar to that of other urbanites than 
it was to commune members.32 On balance one can safely stress 
that the revolution created two increasingly distinct worlds of 
organisational experience that corresponded quite closely to the 
rural-urban divide. 
32 Urban collective units did tend to pay their employees less well than 
state units, and to provide a narrower range of fringe benefits. 
However, during the 1960s and 1970s the collective/state distinction 
became increasingly blurred, as collective units were expected to 
conform more closely to the regulations governing state enterprises. 
Those attached to urban collective units could identify more with 
low status state employees than with rural residents. 
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Enforced Contact and Stigmatisation of the Peasantry 
As a byproduct of the systems of migration restrictions and 
household registration instituted during the 1950s, a two-caste 
system was established in China. Individuals belonged to either 
agricultural or non-agricultural households. As with any caste 
system, this status was inherited from one generation to the next. 
Curiously, while other ascribed statuses in the PRC (such as class 
origin labels) followed the traditional pattern of patrilineal 
inheritance, household registration status explicitly followed the 
maternal line.33 Individuals born to rural mothers were, except in 
special circumstances, stuck for life with a rural registration.34 
This system of migration restrictions and graded urban/rural 
status categories might have been sufficient, in combination with 
the attractions of urban places in any society, to cause a growing 
denigration of villagers and rural life by those who lived in China's 
cities. However, a set of practices was implemented in addition to 
this status hierarchy that guaranteed such denigration. Selection for 
movement up within the hierarchy became a rare privilege; 
enforced movement down to a less urban place, and particularly to 
a rural area, became a common punishment. Urban residence, even 
33 For a discussion of how the system worked, see Sulamith Heins 
Potter, 'The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social Order', 
Modem China 9 (1983), pp.465-99. The practice of following the 
maternal line ensured that the children of men with urban 
registrations who chose to marry rural women would have rural 
registrations. An urban woman marrying a rural man was a much 
rarer occurrence. 
34 Within the urban caste, of course, there were also important 
subcastes based upon household registration and migration 
regulations. Even though a person had a non-agricultural household 
registration, he or she was not entitled to the opportunities and 
benefits of a higher order urban place. In effect, then, these systems 
established a ladder-like hierarchy of urban places, with agricultural 
households as one vast bottom rung. 
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if for many years or even generations, was not a right but a 
privilege that could be lost. 
Many of the campaigns to send urbanites down to the 
countryside were accompanied by rhetoric designed to obscure or 
minimise the fact that a loss of status was involved. Urban educated 
youths sent 'up to the mountains and down to the villages' were 
supposed to learn from the peasants and contribute to rural 
construction; intellectuals and cadres sent to 'May 7th Cadre 
Schools' after 1968 were depicted as part of a general scheme of 
rotating stints of purification via rural labour; urbanites dispersed to 
rural areas after the Ussuri River clashes in 1969 were portrayed as 
helping to prepare for a possible Soviet invasion. Since none of 
these moves was either universal or voluntary, and since it was 
particularly those who possessed questionable individual or family 
histories and lacked bureaucratic patrons who were 'sent down' , the 
rhetoric was not successful in hiding the fact that a severe form of 
downward mobility was involved. The precariousness of urban 
status and privileges led most urban families to exert tremendous 
efforts to maintain that status, or to regain it if it had been lost. 35 
One can debate whether, on balance, the day-to-day 
experiences of enforced common residence and work in the 
countryside of urbanites and villagers which were so common 
during the period between 1949 and 1978 created more amity or 
enmity. Individual accounts of these experiences differ, with some 
stressing heightened appreciation of rural life and culture, and 
others emphasising the bleakness and backwardness of the 
villages.36 We know from research on intergroup relations in other 
35 
36 
Urban youths who had been sent to the countryside prior to 1966 saw 
the Cultural Revolution as a chance to express their grievances with 
the policy and demand a return to the cities. Many joined rebel Red 
Guard factions that contributed to the turmoil of the period. See the 
discussion in Bernstein, op. cit., ch.6. 
For an example of a fairly positive account, see Jack Chen, A Year in 
Upper Felicity (New York: Macmillan, 1973); for a quite different 
picture, consult He Liyi, Mr. China 's Son (Boulder: Westview, 1993) 
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societies that prolonged contact between status equals promotes 
mutual appreciation, while prolonged contact between groups with 
unequal status is likely to heighten mutual antagonism.37 On 
balance the negative outcome was probably more often true in 
China. Higher-status urbanites forced to endure hardship in the 
countryside were unlikely to feel common cause with the villagers 
around them, and certainly a high regard for villagers and rural life 
is not a sentiment widely shared in China's cities today. Nor does it 
appear common for urbanites to stay in close touch with the 
villagers they lived and worked with during their rural exile 
periods. Rural labour stints for urbanites, intended to help break 
down the 'contradiction' between city and countryside, generally 
ended up having the opposite effect. 
The Growing Gap in Culture and Customs 
Given the many structural differences and barriers constructed after 
1949 between rural and urban, it is not surprising that the customs 
and ways of life of Chinese villagers and urbanites increasingly 
diverged. Perhaps the most extreme example of this divergence is 
to be found in the customs surrounding death. In China's large 
cities cremation increasingly replaced burial from the 1950s, and 
eventually became mandatory. In rural areas, with few exceptions, 
burial remains the rule even today. Accompanying this distinction 
37 
and Yu Luojin, A Chinese Winter's Tale (Hong Kong: Renditions, 
1986). 
The classic statement is Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 
(Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954). For a review of later research 
on this point, see M. Hewstone and R. Brown (eds), Contact and 
Conflict in Encounters (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). One other 
factor affecting group relations is whether the two groups are 
involved in competitive or cooperative activities. Both typically 
occurred when urbanites practised 'three togethers' with their 
peasant hosts. However, the inherent zero-sum nature of work point 
remuneration systems probably tipped the balance toward 
competition and, therefore, toward antagonism. 
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are a number of others - for example, urban funerals became 
spartan, collective affairs with local cadres officiating, while rural 
funerals remained family-based and more elabourate; in addition, 
religious rituals and death anniversary observances that used to be 
obligatory virtually disappeared in large cities, while at least 
truncated versions of such rituals, even including 'second burials' 
in some regions, persisted in the countryside.38 
Diverging customs became visible in many other realms. 
Arranged marriages virtually disappeared in large cities, and 
introductions arranged by parents became less and less common. In 
the countryside, in contrast, parental introductions remained quite 
common, and parentally dictated marriage partners not rare. In most 
rural areas a substantial bride-price payment had to be given by the 
groom's family to the bride's. In the cities family-to-family 
exchanges (either bride-price or dowry) became rare, although from 
the 1970s onward, expectations soared that the groom would 
present expensive gifts to the bride herself. In the cities many 
young couples started out married life in a separate residence, and 
living with the wife's parents became an acceptable arrangement, if 
still less common than moving in with the husband's family. In 
most rural areas, in contrast, moving in with the husband's parents 
was still the general rule. Residence with the bride's family was 
seen as highly undesirable, and this fact is connected with other 
growing disparities between rural and urban customs. In China's 
large cities daughters as well as sons began to share responsibility 
for supporting aging parents; in rural areas support only from sons 
remained the general rule. 39 
38 
39 
See my paper, 'Death in the People's Republic of China' , in James 
Watson and Evelyn Rawski (eds), Death Ritual in Late Imperial and 
Modem China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). The 
'second burial' custom, in which the bones of the deceased are dug 
up, cleaned, placed in a special urn, and reburied in an appropriate 
site, continues in many areas of Guangdong and Fujian. 
These contrasts are based primarily on my own past research in 
collabouration with William Parish. See Parish and Whyte, Village 
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The realm in which the divergence of patterns between rural 
and urban can be documented most precisely is fertility. In the early 
1950s the average rural mother was having only about 16 per cent 
more children than her urban counterpart. In 1960 the Great Leap-
induced famine wiped out this differential, with urban mothers 
tending to have 3 per cent more births than rural ones. In later 
years, however, a sharp differential emerged as urban women 
reduced their fertility much more than rural women. Rural women 
tended to have about twice as many babies as their urban 
counterparts (see Table 1, line 9).40 In recent years this disparity 
has been enshrined in official family planning enforcement, with 
women in big cities required to conform to the 'one child' policy, 
while rural women generally face a de facto two child limit. 
40 
and Family in Contemporary China, op. cit.; and Whyte and Parish, 
Urban Life in Contemporary China, op. cit. Although our work was 
not based on a representative selection of locales in China and was 
heavily slanted toward Guangdong, the generalisations offered above 
seem consistent with the work done by others in different locales. 
However, we lack ethnographic descriptions of the contemporary 
customs of large parts of the Chinese countryside. Evidence that 
rural and urban practices in regard to mate choice and weddings 
diverged in the 1950s is presented in my article, 'Adaptation of Rural 
Family Patterns to Urban Life in Chengdu', op. cit. 
The statistic being referred to in this section is the total fertility rate 
(TFR), which is a projection demographers calculate to indicate how 
many births an average woman would have in her lifetime if current 
fertility patterns continued. In 1950 the rural TFR was 5.7 and the 
urban TFR 4.9; in 1955 the comparable figures were 6.3 and 5.4, and 
in 1960 4.0 and 4.1. In recent years the rural TFR has generally been 
in the 2.5-3 range, and the urban TFR in the 1.2-1.5 range. See 
Ansley Coale and Chen Shenli, Basic Data on Fertility in the 
Provinces of China, 1940-1982 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1987); 
Zhong Guochen, Huang Dexing and Pan Chuanjiu (eds), Quanguo 
shengyu jieyu chouyang diaocha baogaoji, shengyu juan [Collection 
of Reports on the National Fertility and Birth Control Survey, 
Fertility Volume] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renkou Chubanshe, 1993), 
p.13. 
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As a result of the enlarging of such disparities in social, 
cultural, and even religious patterns, China's urbanites and villagers 
had less in common than they did before the revolution. Indeed, 
urbanites who where sent to live in the countryside in the 1970s 
often felt like amateur anthropologists, confronted with strange 
customs that had to be deciphered. The fact that many such customs 
were traditional ones that urban rusticants had never learned did not 
make it any easier to appreciate them. Given all of the other 
structures and practices discussed earlier, it was easy for Chinese 
urbanites to conclude that rural people were ignorant and backward, 
hopelessly mired in feudal attitudes and behaviour. 
To sum up, in fundamental respects the gap between city and 
countryside grew much larger during the period of Mao Zedong' s 
rule. Underneath the egalitarian rhetoric, a structure was being 
institutionalised that had more in common with feudalism than 
socialism. Rural · residents were bound to the land and required to 
engage in agricultural production. Urban residents were also tightly 
bound to their work units and residences, where the preferential 
treatment they received encouraged them to look down on their 
rural brethren. The population was divided into two separate castes, 
with increasingly diverging lives and concerns. China's peasants 
were the moving force behind the revolution, but most of the fruits 
of victory were reserved for urbanites. 
Sources of Urban Bias, 1949-1978 
How did it happen that a new government with deep roots in the 
Chinese countryside implemented policies and practices that 
promoted such pervasive forms of urban bias? A proper answer 
would require access to a multitude of internal documents from the 
1950s, when most elements of the system were put in place. Instead 
I offer here a speculative explanation, based on the logic of the 
many policies and practices involved. At the core of the new system 
of rural-urban relations were the institutions designed to restrict 
urban migration and to create contrasting organisational systems in 
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city and countryside. Together, these core elements suggest a 
special concern of China's post-1949 leaders with preserving urban 
social order. Mao and his colleagues seemed particularly anxious to 
give everyone who resided in large cities a secure place there (in 
terms of jobs, housing, health care, and protection from 
unemployment, crime, and other urban ills), while at the same time 
preventing those who didn't have such a secure place from flooding 
into the cities. Concern for the peasants was of a lesser order -
their livelihood should be improved as much as possible, but 
primarily through the efforts of local communities, rather than 
through state guarantees and funds. It appears as if the rural roots of 
China's revolution meant that Mao and his colleagues took the 
peasantry for granted, while they felt they had to devote special 
attention to the needs of cities and urban dwellers. 
I am suggesting, paradoxically, that the institutionalisation of 
such comprehensive advantages for urbanites may be attributable to 
the special fear and hostility that the Chinese Communist Party felt 
toward cities and urban life. Cities had been, after all, centres of 
KMT control since the failed urban insurrections of 1927. They had 
also been centres of foreign influence, and of prostitution, secret 
societies, drug addiction, begging, and other social evils. Cities 
were also, of course, centres of critical intellectual life and social 
protest movements against unjust rulers. The inexperience of the 
CCP in running large cities until 1948 convinced some foreign 
observers that the new government could not possibly do so without 
continued Western assistance and involvement.41 This hope proved 
illusory, but China's new leaders may have felt that, compared with 
mobilising villagers for guerrilla struggle and land reform, the task 
of subduing the cities would be much more difficult.42 Fixation 
41 
42 
See Noel Barber, The Fall of Shanghai (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
This discussion was developed more fully in my earlier book with 
William Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China, op. cit. See also 
the discussion in Lu Feng, 'The Origins and Formation of the Unit 
(Danwei) System', Chinese Sociology and Anthropology (Spring 
1993), pp.1-92. On the reasons for China's urban bias, consult also 
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with the problem of making sure that urbanites would not cause 
them problems led the CCP to adopt practices that institutionalised 
severe disadvantages for the rural population. 
The assumption that villagers would benefit from having 
China led by individuals of rural origin turned out to be dead 
wrong. In more democratic societies it may be the case that leaders 
from the countryside feel they have to serve the interests of their 
rural constituents, but in China's Leninist state very different 
considerations applied. Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders felt 
bound by no constitutuency, rural or otherwise, and it was precisely 
their lack of a social base in the cities that led them to adopt 
measures that served urban interests. 
One other element that has to be taken into account in 
explaining the ironic urban bias enforced after 1949 is the role of 
Marxist ideology. The Marxism of China's new leaders oriented 
them to think in terms of classes as the fundamental units of social 
and political analysis. Given the agrarian nature of the society they 
had gained control of, the CCP had to modify conventional class 
analysis to suit Chinese conditions, adding a multitude of 
categories. Nonetheless, in practice these categories were lumped 
together into 'good class' and 'bad class' groupings, which then 
became the basis for repeated class struggle campaigns. Indeed, 
class origin labels became the focus for preference, sanctions, and 
political struggles long after they had ceased to have any 
meaningful relationship to the means of production or present 
economic circumstances.43 If there were issues of exploitation, 
injustice, or redistribution in China, these were seen in terms of 
official class categories. Urban versus rural did not fit this 
framework, since good and bad classes existed on both sides of the 
divide. 
43 
Peter Nolan and Gordon White, 'Urban Bias, Rural Bias or State 
Bias? Urban-Rural Relations in Post-Revolutionary China', Journal 
of Development Studies 20 (1984), pp.55-82. 
See the discussion in Richard Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese 
Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 
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Curiously, it was Mao Zedong who particularly championed 
other ways of looking at the Chinese social landscape. In speeches 
and articles such as 'On the Ten Major Relationships' (1956) and 
'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' 
(1957), Mao stressed the importance of non-class cleavages, 
including the 'contradiction' between rural and urban. He also 
noted the danger that such 'non-antagonistic contradictions' could 
be transformed into antagonistic ones. Nevertheless, in his later 
years Mao presided over an accentuation of class struggle during 
which concern for non-class cleavages fell by the wayside. 
Whenever potential contradictions between rural and urban were 
discussed, the response tended to involve public relations slogans 
about friendship and mutual support across the divide and self-
reliant development for rural communities, rather than a serious 
redirection of state investment priorities or other efforts to make the 
conditions of life in cities and countryside more equal.44 The 
primacy of class analysis and class struggle during the period prior 
to 1978 obscured the extent to which the rural-urban gap was being 
aggravated. This lack of attention and concern prevented anything 
from being done to reverse the trend toward a growing rural-urban 
cleavage. 
The Reform Era: Closing the Rural-Urban Gap? 
The reform policies instituted in China since 1978 include no 
commitment to close the rural-urban gap or, for that matter, to 
44 The regular practice of sending large numbers of urbanites to live 
and work in rural areas might seem an exception to this 
generalisation. At the time these programs were described as 
intended in part to foster rural economic development. However, the 
financial burden of these programs on the state budget was minimal 
and these programs also had the effect of reducing the number of 
people entitled to urban benefits and guarantees. See the discussion 
in Bernstein, op. cit. For the dismal record of the PRC in agricultural 
investment, see Lardy, Agriculture in China's Modem Economic 
Development, op. cit. 
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foster any other aspect of equality. Instead, with rapid economic 
development the central objective, whatever policies and trends are 
likely to further that goal were accepted. Many observers argue that 
the result has been both dynamic growth and rising inequality. 
However, given the paradoxical fact that the previous commitment 
to equality coincided temporally with the institutionalisation of a 
caste-like cleavage between China's cities and villages, it is worth 
considering whether the rural-urban gap has widened or narrowed 
since 1978.45 The same five aspects of rural-urban relations 
discussed earlier (the income gap, migration and kinship bonds, 
organisational systems, rural-urban contacts, and the gap in culture 
and customs) will be examined briefly in the pages that follow. 
The best available estimates indicate that initially there was 
some closing of the gap in incomes between rural and urban China 
after 1978. The significant rise in agricultural procurement prices at 
the outset or1he reforms, the collapse of collectivised agriculture, 
the restoration of freedom to engage in market exchanges, and other 
changes produced a more rapid increase in rural than urban 
incomes. In official statistics the per capita income gap shrank from 
2.36:1 in 1978 to less than 1.9:1 by the mid-1980s.46 However, 
after the mid- l 980s, as the impact of the rural changes receded and 
grain yields stagnated, and as urban reforms were pushed 
vigorously ahead, the trend was reversed, with the rural-urban 
income gap widening to its 1978 level or even worse (see Table 1, 
lines 2-3).47 While the average income gap between city and 
45 
46 
47 
See also the discussion in Jean Oi, 'Reform and Urban Bias in 
China', Journal of Development Studies 29 (1993), pp.129-48. 
See Zhao Renwei, 'Three Features of the Distribution of Income', 
op. cit., Table 2.5. 
Official statistics give the per capita urban-rural ratio for 1990 as 
2.42: 1 (see ibid). The more detailed collabourative 1988 income 
survey reported on in the same volume produced a per capita urban-
rural income estimate for that year of 2.43: 1, whereas the estimate 
for 1988 from China's State Statistical Bureau was only 2.19: 1, so 
these official figures probably underestimate the size of the gap in all 
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countryside has deteriorated since the mid-1980s, the growing 
diversity in economic activity in the countryside may obscure this 
fact in popular conciousness. Given the publicity devoted to 
booming rural industries and to local industrial magnates who build 
elabourate mansions and drive around dusty rural roads in 
chauffeured foreign-made limousines, villagers and urbanites may 
not be fully aware of the overall deterioration in the relative 
incomes of rural families.48 
In regard to other aspects of popular welfare the rural-urban 
gap has widened further during the reform era. The years after 1978 
saw a sharp decline in rural secondary school enrollments, as 
village parents kept children (and particularly daughters) at home to 
work. As a result, the rural share of students enrolled in lower 
middle schools fell from 77.5 per cent in 1978 to 68.2 per cent in 
1986 and 59.7 per cent in 1993, while the drop in the rural share at 
the upper middle school level was even more dramatic - from 61.1 
48 
years. On the stagnation in rural incomes since the mid-1980s, see 
also Scott Rozelle and Leying Jiang, 'Survival Strategies and 
Recession in China's Agricultural Economy', paper presented at the 
Association for Asian Studies Meetings, Boston, April 1994; Scott 
Rozelle, 'Stagnation without Equity: Patterns of Growth and 
Inequality in China's Rural Economy', The China Journal 35 
(January 1996, forthcoming). Official Chinese statistics on trends in 
per capita consumption in urban and rural areas display a similar, 
curvilinear trend during the reform era. The urban to rural per capita 
consumption ratio stood at 2.9 in 1978; it was reduced to only 2.2 in 
1985 but then began to worsen once again, reaching 3.1 in 1992. 
Figures from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 
1993, op. cit., p.246. 
I do not mean to suggest that China's villagers are generally 
optimistic that they can attain prosperity. In recent years there have 
been recurring rural riots and other forms of protest against poor 
economic treatment. However, it may be the case that hostility in 
poor rural areas is directed more toward people in richer villages and 
regions, and less toward urbanites in general, than would have been 
the case in earlier years. 
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per cent to 25.2 per cent and then 18.5 per cent over the same years 
(see Table 1, lines 5-6).49 Along the same lines, the reform era saw 
a collapse of a large portion of the rural cooperative medical 
insurance systems established during the collective era, with 
various kinds of pay-as-you-go collective and private medical 
facilities only partially filling the gap.50 The number of village 
midwives and health care workers declined sharply, and the 
proportion of hospital beds in rural hospitals fell from 61.4 per cent 
in 1978 to 55 per cent in 1986 and 42.9 per cent in 1993 (see Table 
1, line 7).51 
49 
50 
51 
See the sources cited in Table 1. According to the same sources, the 
share of rural students in national primary school enrollments 
dropped from 88. l per cent to 82. 7 per cent and then 72.2 per cent 
during this same period (see Table 1, line 4). As another reflection of 
the rural drop, in the study of female educational attainment cited 
earlier, the rural-urban gap in women students completing secondary 
schooling widened once more from 48 per cent (96 per cent urban 
completion versus 48 per cent rural completion) for those born in 
1965 to 56 per cent (92 per cent versus 36 per cent) for those born in 
1967. See Lavely et al., op. cit., p.67. 
In 1989 only 4.8 per cent of China's administrative villages still had 
cooperative medical insurance programs in operation. See Gail 
Henderson, John Akin, Li Zhiming, Jin Shuigao, Ma Haijiang and 
Ge Keyou, 'Equity and the Utilization of Health Services: Report of 
an Eight-Province Survey in China', Social Science Medicine 39 
(1994), p.687. See also Henderson, op. cit. 
The number of village midwives decreased from 743,498 in 1978 to 
466,974 in 1988, while the number of village doctors and health care 
workers declined from 1,559,214 in 1975 to 1,247,045 in 1988. 
Figures from Zhongguo weisheng nianjian, 1989 [China Health 
Yearbook 1989] (Beijing: China Medical Publishing House, 1989), 
pp.572-3. I thank Gail Henderson for referring me to this source. The 
hospital bed figures are computed from China Statistical Yearbook, 
1993, op. cit., p.726. During the reform period, the proportion of 
doctors serving in rural hospitals continued its long decline, from 
57.2 per cent in 1978 to only 41.2 per cent in 1993 (see Table 1, line 
31 
The contrasting trends in rural per capita income versus access 
to education and health care in both the collective and reform eras 
indicate that policies that affect the public/private balance in the use 
of funds have a particularly dramatic impact in the Chinese 
countryside. The depression of rural household incomes and 
consumption levels during the Maoist era stemmed in part from 
state-enforced local investment in community infrastructure, 
including health care and educational facilities. In the reform era, 
rural households have captured more of the economic gains, but 
community infrastructures have suffered.52 
While no sustained progress has been made in reducing the 
rural-urban gap in income and welfare in the reform period, more 
substantial progress has been made in regard to weakening barriers 
against migration. The household registration system remains more 
or less intact, although there are now provisions allowing those 
with agricultural registrations to convert these to rural township 
registrations if they meet certain conditions. More significantly, 
52 
8). These figures refer to physicians and do not include the village 
health care workers. 
What is not clear is whether any substantial share of the deterioration 
of the rural share of school enrollments and of health care facilities 
can be accounted for by migration to urban areas and administrative 
reclassification of rural areas under urban jurisdictions during the 
reform period. One careful recent study concludes that the most 
accurate estimate of the urban share of China's population in 1990 is 
27 per cent. See Kam Wing Chan, 'Urbanization and Rural-Urban 
Migration in China since 1982: A New Baseline', Modem China 20 
(1994), pp.243-81. Using this figure, the rural share of all the 
educational and health facilities shown in Table 1 for recent years 
except primary school enrollments display clear and increasing urban 
bias. (Even primary schooling may contain a slight urban bias, given 
the higher fertility levels in recent years in the countryside). 
However, several contradictory figures on the urban share of the 
population have been used in Chinese sources in recent years, as 
discussed in the Chan article, and it is not clear what breakdown lies 
at the base of the various series shown in Table 1. 
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urban rationing has been dramatically reduced, as have prohibitions 
against urban families and employers hiring individuals without 
local registrations. Changes such as these have unleashed a flood of 
migration, with some estimating that at any point in time there are 
80-100 million members of a 'floating population' residing in 
China's cities. 
Rural individuals still cannot readily obtain urban 
registrations, and even if they stay and work in an urban area for 
years they retain their separate and lower status. In addition, they 
mostly perform arduous and dirty jobs that urbanites would not 
want to perform. Nevertheless, millions feel that low status urban 
jobs are preferable to staying in the village. Furthermore, with the 
breakdown of the commune system, large-scale migration across 
rural areas has also resumed. One of the largest surveys undertaken 
of the new migration flows found, in fact, that nearly 50 per cent of 
the out-migrants had gone to other rural areas, rather than into the 
cities.53 These changes mean that in distressed villages people once 
again have the option of going where they can earn a better living 
and send funds back home. 
It is unclear whether this increased movement of people has 
done much to rebuild kinship bonds across the rural-urban divide. 
To be sure, most members of the floating population in China' s 
cities are sojourners from villages and towns and retain strong 
bonds there. However, the marginal nature of the urban identities of 
most 'floaters' means that they cannot do as much to forge human 
ties between city and countryside as they could if they secured a 
more permanent urban status. Some of the new migrants may have 
used long-standing and perhaps dormant kinship relations with 
urbanites to gain access to urban jobs. However, this does not 
appear to be the dominant mode used by 'floaters' to obtain access 
53 See Geng Dechang (ed.), Quanguo 220-cun Laodongli qingkuang 
diaocha zilaoji, 1978-1986 [Materials from a Survey of the Labour 
Force in 220 Villages in China, 1978-1986] (Beijing: China 
Statistical Press, 1989). The survey covered 91,989 households in 
villages in 11 provinces in 1986. 
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to urban opportumtles, and I am not aware of any general 
inclination of China's urbanites to search for their roots in their 
native villages and rekindle dormant kinship relations.54 Nor is 
there any evidence to suggest that urbanites in greater numbers are 
marrying individuals from the countryside. Despite the increased 
movement of people in China today, the dual caste nature of rural 
and urban residence established during the years of Mao's rule 
persists today and inhibits the development of kinship ties between 
urban and rural castes. 
The organisational systems that affect the lives of Chinese 
have altered since 1978, modestly in the cities and more 
dramatically in the countryside. In rural areas, of course, the 
dismantling of the communes and the institutionalisation of the 
household contract system have revived the family as the primary 
organiser of production activity. In the cities a modest proportion of 
private enterprises, generally taking the form of family-run firms, 
has arisen as well, and there are also foreign joint ventures and 
other novel organisational forms. However, most urbanites still 
have their lives organised by state enterprises or the rapidly 
growing collective enterprises. This means that the conditions of 
organisational life and social control for most rural and urban 
residents are even more divergent than during the pre-reform 
period. Whereas in China's cities the grip of work units, residents 
committees, and other bureaucratic forms has weakened only 
54 One study conducted in Dongguan city in the Pearl River Delta 
region of Guangdong found that less than 10 per cent of the outside 
workers hired in that city had relied on introductions through friends 
and relatives. The bulk of such hires occurred through bureaucratic 
arrangements by city and rural county labour bureaus and by 
enterprise labour bosses. From an unpublished survey cited in 
Dorothy Solinger, 'China's Urban Transients in the Transition from 
Socialism and the Collapse of the Communist "Urban Public Goods 
Regime'", Comparative Politics 27 (1995), p.131. 
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slightly, in the countryside the collapse of the commune system has 
more substantially 'de-bureaucratised' rural life.55 
If we take a broader view, however, we will note important 
trends that make the conditions of rural and urban life more similar 
than in the past. The dismantling of the urban rationing system and 
the flowering of market activity in China mean that both villagers 
and urbanites face pressures to produce products or services with 
market appeal and a need to make consumption decisions when 
faced by multiple choices. To the homogenising impact of the 
market can be added the influence of communications. Although 
the poorest and most remote villages are still being bypassed, the 
spread of television and other forms of modern communications 
into the countryside means that increasingly Chinese villagers are 
participating in much the same media and cultural universe as are 
urbanites.56 As a result of trends such as these, China's urbanites 
and rural residents are not as walled off from one another culturally 
55 
56 
There is a substantial debate over whether decollectivisation and 
other post-1978 changes have given rural residents greater autonomy 
from bureaucratic control, and if so, to what degree. Clearly Chinese 
villagers still are subject to powerful controls over many of their 
activities, as the draconian enforcement of official family planning 
policy shows most vividly. However, the intimate regulation of the 
day-to-day work and private lives of rural residents has clearly 
weakened substantially with the collapse of the commune system. 
See my paper, 'Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle', in 
Victor Nee and David Stark (eds), Remaking the Economic 
Institutions of Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). 
For an alternative view, see Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
By some estimates about 10 per cent of China's population still does 
not have access to electricity, a figure which means that about 15 per 
cent of the rural population is left out. See The New York Times, 7 
November 1994. In the commune era the media experience of most 
rural residents differed quite sharply from urbanites, with wired 
broadcasting networks being a central feature of rural, but not urban, 
life. 
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as in the past, despite the continued contrasts in the way most work 
is organised in the two settings. 
One major change in rural-urban relations in the reform era has 
been the virtual termination of programs to send urbanites to 
resettle in the countryside. 57 The cities and not the countryside are 
now where most contacts between rural and urban residents occur. 
China's large cities are awash with both large numbers of 'floaters' 
and also with regular streams of rural sellers of produce and 
handicrafts. Since these contacts occur as a result of voluntary 
moves 'upward' in the urban hierarchy, rather than involuntary 
moves 'downward', they are less likely to produce resentment and 
conflict. However, several features of the situation limit the ability 
of these contemporary contacts to foster mutual understanding and 
appreciation. Rural migrant workers are repeatedly made aware of 
their lower caste status and are relatively powerless and vulnerable 
to mistreatment and exploitation in the cities.58 Urbanites, for their 
part, have very little opportunity to get to know members of the 
floating population personally and learn about their ways of life, 
and many fear rural migrants as a source crime and other social 
problems. The relatively superficial and ambivalent contacts 
between rural and urban residents do little to bridge the 
psychological barriers between rural and urban that were erected 
during the Mao years.59 
57 
58 
59 
There are occasional reports recently of urbanites still being 
mobilised to serve in rural locales and in border and minority areas. 
However, these efforts appear to be on a smaller scale and to be 
carried out on a more truly voluntary basis than the rustication 
campaigns of the Mao era. After 1978 most of the urban educated 
youths who remained in the countryside from those earlier 
campaigns were allowed to return to the cities. 
See the discussion in Dorothy Solinger, 'China's Transients and the 
State: A Form of Civil Society?' , Politics and Society 21 (1993), 
pp.91-122. 
One survey conducted in Beijing in 1991-92 found that 83 per cent 
of the migrants surveyed had no personal contacts with any local 
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Indeed, China's urbanites continue to view their rural 
countrymen as backward and ignorant, and to rationalise the 
privileges of urban residents as the deserved perquisites of those 
who can contribute most to national development. Recent research 
raise serious questions about this rationalisation. A survey of 
individual attitudes was carried out by Alex Inkeles and colleagues 
in 1990 in Tianjin and its rural suburbs. Three decades earlier 
Inkeles launched a research program which focused on examining 
the development of 'modern' attitudes in individuals in six nations. 
Over the years his surveys were replicated in many additional 
countries, including one state socialist society (Bulgaria in 1988). 
In this research Inkeles and his collabourators were able to validate 
a syndrome of modern attitudes which is much the same around the 
globe, and which includes components such as feelings of personal 
efficacy, the ability to rationally plan one's activities, an inclination 
to use scientific approaches to solve problems, and so forth.60 
In every other country in which such surveys have been 
carried out, including socialist Bulgaria, urban people were 
significantly more modern in their attitudes than rural people. In 
Tianjin, in dramatic contrast, rural people were significantly more 
modern than urbanites! Furthermore, within urban areas, 
individuals employed in state enterprises were the least modern of 
all the groups included in the sample.61 Inkeles and his colleagues 
explain these counter-intuitive findings by arguing that the nature 
60 
61 
residents (figures from an unpublished MA thesis at Beijing 
University by Zhu Suhong, cited in Solinger, 'China's Urban 
Transients in the Transition from Socialism' , op. cit., footnote 44). 
For a detailed discussion of the attitude syndrome of 'overall 
modernity' and its correlates in the original six countries studied 
(India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Israel, Chile and Argentina), see Alex 
lnkeles and David Smith, Becoming Modem (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974). 
See Alex Inkeles, C. Montgomery Broaded and Zhongde Cao, 
'Causes and Consequences of Individual Modernity in Mainland 
China', unpublished paper, 1995. 
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of contemporary Chinese urban life, despite reforms, continues to 
encourage orientations of fatalism and dependency much like a 
'traditional' feudal or tribal society, rather than the rational 
planning and sense of personal efficacy fostered by urban 
institutions in other societies. In rural areas, in contrast, the reforms 
have more substantially broken down the collective dependency of 
the Mao era and substituted conditions of life in which individuals 
and families know they have to rationally plan and sacrifice for the 
future in order to survive and get ahead. The more substantial 
nature of China's rural reforms, as compared with those in the city, 
has thus reversed the 'normal' differentials in personal attitudes and 
orientations. If we accept this argument, then this evidence 
indicates that China's rural residents now possess on average 
orientations more conducive to economic development than do 
urbanites, yet urbanites continue to stigmatise them as backward. 
In terms of the final realm considered earlier, it is not clear 
whether the gap in culture and customs that grew between China's 
cities and villages prior to 1978 is being reduced. In one realm. 
fertility rates, surveys from the early 1990s indicate a further 
tightening of family planning enforcement, with China's population 
growth rate falling below replacement level. This stunning 
development means that rural fertility rates have decreased 
substantially, reducing the rural:urban fertility gap somewhat below 
the 2:1 figure common during the 1980s (see Table 1, line 12).62 
However, in other realms it appears that reform-era changes have 
62 See the figures cited in Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jianhua, 'Below 
Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at Recent Evidence', 
unpublished paper, March 1994, Table 3. According to figures 
calculated from a 1992 survey conducted by China's State Family 
Planning Commission, by 1991 the total fertility rate in rural China 
dropped below 2 (see Table 1, line 12). For a discussion of how this 
reduction was achieved in rural areas, see Susan Greenhalgh, Zhu 
Chuzhu and Li Nan, 'Restraining Population Growth in Three 
Chinese Villages, 1988-93', Population and Development Review 20 
(1994), pp.365-95. 
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contributed to increased divergence between urban and rural 
customs. The reform era political and economic changes have 
allowed two formerly suppressed cultural streams to revive and 
spread - Western culture and traditional Chinese culture.63 
Although signs of both cultural streams are visible in cities and 
villages alike, Westernisation is the dominant trend in large cities, 
and a resurgence of traditional customs is more visible in the 
villages, despite the homogenising influence to television and other 
media mentioned earlier. Be it Western fashions, classical Western 
music, beauty pageants, or break-dancing, urbanites are more 
affected than rural residents, while ancestor worship, consulting 
geomancers, building new lineage halls, and other revivals or 
modified versions of traditional customs are more a feature of 
contemporary village life.64 On balance it does not appear that 
reform-era changes have reduced the rural-urban gap in customs 
and may even have widened it. 
Conclusion 
The reform era changes have had a mixed and ambiguous impact 
on the rural-urban gap. In some respects the cleavage between town 
and city has been reduced, while in others it appears not to have 
63 
64 
See my article, 'Evolutionary Changes in Chinese Culture' , in C. 
Morrison and R. Dernberger (eds), Asia-Pacific Report, 1989 
(Honolulu: East-West Center, 1989). 
Referring to these customs as 'traditional' obviously does not mean 
that I accept a view of Chinese villagers as generally backward or 
superstitious. Rather, as noted in discussing the survey conducted by 
Alex Inkeles and colleagues, in certain respects Chinese villagers in 
the 1990s appear to be more modern in their outlooks than urban 
people. My use of the term simply indicates that in figuring out how 
to cope with the world around them and in carving out a set of 
customs to express their increased autonomy from the socialist state, 
villagers are more likely than urbanites to draw on (and often 
modify) a repertoire of customs that were familiar from before the 
revolution. 
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changed or has widened. On balance, the legacy of the extreme gap 
that had developed between rural and urban during the Mao era has 
not been reduced in any substantial way. Despite much greater 
movement of people away from China's villages and into the cities, 
China is still characterised essentially by a two-caste system, with 
fundamental distinctions in the lives and opportunities of the people 
born into each caste and relatively little mutual appreciation and 
understanding between the castes. If the terminology were still in 
widespread use, it would be fair to say that during the era of Mao's 
rule an antagonistic or potentially antagonistic contradiction was 
created between China's cities and countryside that persists to this 
day. This contradiction complicates efforts to develop China and 
maintain social control, and it would pose serious obstacles to any 
future effort to democratise China.65 In a fully reformed, market-
based society there is no place for such a caste structure, which 
generates injustice and resentments and wastes human talent. 
Given the existence of such a profound urban bias for more 
than a generation, it would require major policy changes and huge 
state investments in both the countryside and in cities to 
substantially reduce the rural-urban gap.66 An alternative and 
65 
66 
The urbanites who have been the primary advocates of democratic 
reforms in China seem to be profoundly nervous about the prospect 
of sharing electoral and other political rights with their much more 
numerous rural brethren. Long before 1949 advocates of democracy 
argued that some form of tutelage or indirect participation was 
necessary in the countryside in order to compensate for the presumed 
political immaturity of rural people. See the discussion in Andrew J. 
Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985). In view of 
this contention it is worth noting that in many other East Asian 
states, and particularly in Japan, electoral arrangements are rigged so 
that rural people have much more political voice than urbanites 
(although the rural populations in question are, of course, much 
smaller both relatively and absolutely). 
A primary reason why major urban investments would be needed is 
to provide housing and other infrastructure required to cope with 
expanded rural to urban migration. 
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cheaper approach would be to gradually eliminate the many forms 
of special treatment and subsidies enjoyed by urban residents, but 
to do so would risk the urban social turmoil that China's leaders so 
fear.67 There are occasional reports of high-level policy discussions 
in Beijing aimed at phasing out the household registration and 
migration restriction systems and the organisational disparities that 
divide Chinese cities off from the villages, but so far no systematic 
effort along these lines has been mounted.68 Whether or how the 
remaining elements that divide town and countryside into two 
separate castes can be dismantled is one of the most severe 
challenges facing China's future leadership. 
67 
68 
Dorothy Solinger argues that the existence of a huge floating 
population in China's cities is unintentionally whittling away these 
special urban privileges, which she terms the 'urban public goods 
regime'. See her article, 'China's Urban Transients in the Transition 
from Socialism', op. cit. 
See the news report by Kathy Chen, 'China to Erase Policy 
Favouring City over Farm', Wall Street Journal, 26 April 1994, 
p.A19. 
Table 1: Selected Quantitative Indicators of Trends 
in the Rural-Urban Gap in China 
1949 1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 
Per capita income: 
l. Urban/rural income estimates 
2. Official urban/rural income 
3. 1988 survey urban/rural income 
Education: 
4. Rural % of primary students 
5. Rural % of lower middle students 
6. Rural % of upper middle students 
Medical facilities: 
7. Rural % of hospital beds 
8. Rural % of doctors 
Fertility rates: 
9. Rural/urban TFR series I 
JO. RuraVurban TFR series 2 
l I. RuraVurban TFR series 3 
12. RuraVurban TFR series 4 
25 .2 
81.8 
1.2: 1 
ca2:1 
3.48:1 
77.2 
37. l 
7.8 
24.4 25. l 36.7 
80.9 74.7 68.9 
1. 1:1 0.98:1 
ca.3:1 
2.38:1 2.36: I 2 .30: I 
80.9 83.6 87.8 88.l 87.3 
33.7 73.0 72.0 77.5 77.5 
9.0 61.3 54.0 61.1 45.6 
40.2 53.8 60. l 61.4 61.3 
64.7 65.7 58.2 57.2 54.3 
1.9:1 2.2:1 1.9:1 2. 1:1 
2.2: 1 
1.7:1 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Per capita income: 
1. Urban/rural income estimates 
2. Official urban/rural income 1.88:1 2. 15:1 2.19:1 2.19:1 2.31 :1 2.42:1 2.54:1 
3. 1988 survey urban/rural income 2.42:1 
Education: 
4. Rural % of primary students 82.8 82.7 81.5 80.l 78.6 78.4 76.l 74.3 72.2 
5. Rural % of lower middle students 68. l 68.2 68.4 67.5 66.4 66.3 64. l 61.6 59.7 
6. Rural % of upper middle students 26.7 25.2 26.4 25.8 24.6 24. 1 22.I 20.7 18.5 
Medical facilities : 
7. Rural % of hospital beds 56.8 55.0 53.1 49.9 48.0 47.1 46. l 44.5 42.9 
8. Rural % of doctors 49.8 48.1 46.5 45 .2 44.7 44.5 43.7 42.3 41.2 
Fertility rates: 
9. RuraVurban TFR series 
10. RuraJ/urban TFR series 2 2.3:1 2.3: I 2.2:1 
11 . RuraJ/urban TFR series 3 2.0:1 2.0:1 2.0:1 
12. RuraVurban TFR series 4 1.9:1 1.9:1 1.9:1 1.8:1 1.9: I 1.7:1 
41 
42 
Sources: 
1. Urban/rural income estimates: rough, consensus estimates made by 
Western authorities (see discussion in the text). 
2. Official urban/rural income: through 1992 from Zhao Renwei, 
'Three Features of the Distribution of Income during the Transition 
to Reform', in K. Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds), The Distribution of 
Income in China (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.82. Figure given for 
1965 is actually the estimate for 1964. Figure for 1993 computed 
from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1994 
(Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service, 
1994), p.241. 
3. 1988 survey urban/rural income: from Griffin and Zhao, The 
Distribution of Income in China, op. cit., p.34. 
4. Rural percentage of primary students: for 1962 through 1980 from 
Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1949-81 (Beijing: China Encyclopedia 
Press, 1984), p.1023. For 1985 and later years calculated from 
figures on the following pages of the annual volumes in English 
entitled Statistical Yearbook of China (1986 and 1987 editions) and 
China Statistical Yearbook (1988-94 editions): 1985 - p.656 in 
1986 edition; 1986 - p.698 in 1987 edition; 1987 - p.809 of 1988 
edition; 1988 - p.728 of 1989 edition; 1989 - p.692 of 1990 
edition; 1990 - p.663 of 1991 edition; 1991 - p.687 of 1992 
edition; 1992 - p.676 of 1993 edition; and 1993 - p.616 of 1994 
edition. The 1986 volume was published in Hong Kong by the 
Economic Information and Agency; subsequent volumes were 
published in Beijing by the China Statistical Information and 
Consultancy Service. Figure given for 1970 is actually the figure for 
1971. 
5-6. Rural percentage of lower middle school and upper middle school 
students: computed from the same sources as for primary students: 
1962-80 from p.1006; 1985 - p.650; 1986 - p.692; 1987 - p.803; 
1988 - p.722; 1989 - p.686; 1990 - p.657; 1991 - p.681; 1992 
- p.670; and 1993 - p.610. Figures given for 1970 are actually the 
figures for 1971. 
7-8. Rural percentage of hospital beds and of doctors: for all years except 
1949, 1978 and 1993 computed from figures in China Statistical 
Yearbook 1993 (Beijing: China Statistical Information and 
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Consultancy Service, 1993), p.726; figures for 1949 and 1978 
computed from Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1986 (Beijing: China 
Medical Publishing House, 1986), p.493; for 1993 from China 
Statistical Yearbook 1994 (Beijing: China Statistical Information and 
Consultancy Service, 1994), p.665. The hospital bed figures include 
both county hospital beds and beds in township clinics. The figures 
for doctors refer both to those with university training and those with 
specialised secondary school medical training, and to both those 
trained in Chinese and in Western medicine. I presume that the 
figures on doctors do not include village paramedical personnel. 
9. Urban/rural TFR series 1: from 'Analysis of the National One-in-
One Thousand Fertility Sample Survey', Renkou yu jingji 
[Population and Economy] (1983), pp.53-4. Figure given for 1962 is 
actually the estimate for 1960. 
10. Urban/rural TFR series 2: computed from Zhong Guochen, Huang 
Dexing and Pan Chuanjiu, Quanguo shengyu jieyu chouyang 
diaocha baogaoji, shengyu juan [Collection of Reports on the 
National Fertility and Birth Control Survey, Fertility Volume] 
(Beijing: China Population Press, 1993), p.13 (reference provided by 
Wang Feng). 
11-12. Urban/rural TFR series 3 and 4: computed from Griffith Feeney 
and Yuan Jianhua, 'Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close 
Look at Recent Evidence', unpublished paper, Table 3. The figures 
in series 3 are based upon the 1988 two per thousand fertility survey 
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission; for series 4 
they are computed from unit record data of the 1992 survey 
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission. These TFRs, 
unlike those in series 1 and 2, are based upon period parity 
progression ratios. 
THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese 
residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G. E. 
Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for 
all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable 
services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China 
and Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official 
support of the Chinese Consulate-General and was due in particular 
to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William 
Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F. J. Quinland and Sir Colin 
MacKenzie, of Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 
the lecture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, 
but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of the 
lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, 
and the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the 
auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: W. P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the 
Lectureship and a Review of Dr Morrison's Life in China . 10 
May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular 
Reference to Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J. S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese 
Art. 3 May 1934. 
Fourth: W. P. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. 10 May 
1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and 
Chinese Abroad. 2 September 1936. 
Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, China Today: With Special Reference to 
Higher Education. 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A. F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism on 
China. 17 May 1938. 
Eighth: S. H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 5 
June 1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the 
Westerner. 29 May 1940. 
Tenth: W. G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese 
Democracy. 5 June 1941. 
Eleventh: D. B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 
September 1948. 
Twelfth: J. K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 
1949. 
Thirteenth: C. P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 
19 March 1951. 
Fourteenth: H. V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison 's Life and 
Work. 4 December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 October 
1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 27 
July 1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D. 25-27) and 
the Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955.* 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang 
and Lung-Men. 17 October 1956. 
Nineteenth: Otto P. N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese 
Civil Service. 4 November 1957. 
Twentieth: A. R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on 
the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 
1958. 
Twenty-first: C. N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 
October 1959. 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The 
Golden Age. 5October1960.* 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with 
Other Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. 1August1961. 
Twenty-fourth: N. G. D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in 
Chinese Linguistics. 22 November 1962.* 
Twenty-fifth: H. F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign 
Policy. 3 October 1963. 
Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, Calender, Cannon and Clock in the 
Cultural Relations between Europe and China. 18 November 
1964. 
Twenty-seventh: A. M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy 
Success or Failure? 9 August 1966.* 
Twenty-eighth: J. W. de Jong, Buddha's Word in China, 18 
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